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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST NATIONAL BANK 
IN GRAND JUNCTION, 
a National Banking Association, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
RALPH OSBORNE and 
JIM L. HUDSON, 
Defendants and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
12804 
NOTE: For clarity the Appellant will be re-
ferred to as Hudson and the Respondent as Bank. 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Hudson's statement is satisfactory. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Hudson's statement is correct. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Bank requests the Court to affirm the judgment 
of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Except as set forth hereafter, Bank agrees with 
Hudson's statement of the facts. 
1 
( 1) On pages 8-9 of his Brief, Hudson presents 
the testimony of the Bank's vice president, James 
Mackley, as his personal standard of conduct: 
... that it is not his practice to either meet 
with or in any fashion contact out of town 
guarantors to verify the guarantee, even if 
the guarantor is unknown, so long as he 
(Mackley) is satisfied everything is in order; 
. . . (R. 142-145) 
This statement in Hudson's Brief is stated in 
terms of the first person, whereas Mr. Mackley testi-
fied in terms of the third person, i.e., the First Na-
tional Bank in Grand Junction. 
(2) Page 9, Brief of Hudson: 
When asked how the funds were disburs-
ed, Mr. Mackley testified that the proceeds of 
the loan were disbursed directly to or for the 
benefit of Osborne, and that none of the pro-
ceeds were disbursed to Hudson. (R. 141) 
Mr. Mackley testified that G,S far G,S he knew, the 
funds were disbursed to Osborne, and that Mackley 
made no disbursement of funds to Hudson. (Empha-
sis added). 
(3) The following additional facts are submit-
ted by Bank: 
(a) Hudson, personally and through 
counsel, neither admits nor denies that the 
signature upon the Loan Guaranty Agreement 
is that of defendant Jim L. Hudson (R. 7 and 
R. 98); however, Hudson does not quarrel 
with the conclusion of Mr. Harris, the hand-
2 
writing expert, that it is Hudson's signature. 
(R. 43) 
(b) Hudson, personally and through 
counsel, admits that he does not know how his 
signature came to be placed on the Loan Guar-
anty Agreement. (R. 7 and R. 98) 
( c) The handwriting expert also stat-
ed that the Loan Guaranty Agreement was not 
slipped into a stack of documents to be signed 
in a series; if it was in a stack of documents, 
it was the top or first document. (R. 44-45) 
( d) Hudson is a sophisticated business-
man, well versed in commercial transactions. 
For example, he has been in mineral explora-
tion (R. 48, 92); he has an accountant work-
ing for him (R. 49); he and his accountant 
jointly owned an office building (R. 50); he 
has bought savings certificates ( R. 50) and 
sold them (R. 51); he has purchased Moab Na-
tional Bank stock ( R. 55) ; he has signed a 
note as guarantor for a friend (R. 57-58); he 
has a contractor do work for him (R. 57); 
he considered buying control of the 'Moab Na-
tional Bank (R. 61-62); he owned a motel (R. 
88); he owned a car-wash (R. 90); and five 
or six hundred documents have been prepared 
by Hudson's attorney for him since approxi-
mately 1956 (R. 93). 
( e) Mackley testified that the words 
"guaranty" and ~'co-signer" are used pretty 
much interchangeably in his business. (R. 131, 
157-158) A separate guaranty is preferred 
in Mackley's business. (R. 131-132) At the 
time of the loan (to Osborne), Mackley want-
ed a guarantor or co-signer. (R. 132-133) 
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(f) Mackley has been in the banking 
business since 1954 and has been with the Bank 
since 1962 ( R. 1 7) ; Mackley had commercial 
dealings with Osborne, both as a loan officer 
and as a correspondent bank representative 
for six years prior to trial (R. 18, 122-123) · 
Bank had commercial dealings with Osborn~ ' 
since 1961 (R. 124); Bank made many loans 
to Osborne prior to 1969 (R. 124-126); Bank 
, ·· would not loan $60,000.00 to Osborne without 
security (R. 29); Bank would not loan the 
money to Osborne with Hudson as a guarantor 
without the financial statement of Hudson (R. 
129-130) ; Bank received Hudson's financial 
statement ( R. 130) ; Mackley cannot remem-
ber what steps he took to verify Hudson's fi-
nancial statement, but knows he did satisfy , 
himself that it was valid (R. 134, 144); Mack-
ley had authority to loan to the maximum lend- ' 
ing limit of the Bank, $200,000.00, without re-
ference to a loan committee (R. 138-139); 
Mackley attempted to call Hudson to verify 
the guaranty (R. 140); if Bank is satisfied 
everything is in order, it normally will not hold 
up disbursement of the loan to contact the co-
signer or guarantor ( R. 143) ; there is a con- ' 
stant flow of commercial documents between 
Bank and Moab National Bank ( R. 145) ; 
Bank in its correspondent bank position with 
Moab National Bank has shared a number of 
loans with Moab National Bank (R. 146); and 
the form of Loan Guaranty Agreement is used 
by the banks (R. 158). 
(g) Hudson's witness, Utah State Bank 
Examiner, Mr. Chatelain, was not familiar 
·with the practices of banks in Grand Junction 
( R. 182). Mr. Chatelain conceded that con-
siderable discretion is vested in loan officers 
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as to the making of loans, even to poor risks 
based on character alone (R. 186-187). 
ARGUMENT 
Hudson, in his Amended Answer, denies that he 
signed the Loan Guaranty Agreement and alleges, as 
an affirmative defense, that if he did sign, his signa-
ture was fraudulently obtained "by trick, ruse~ 
sleight of hand or other artifice" on the part of Os-
borne. Hudson makes no other claim that would re-
lieve him of liability if he did sign the Loan Guaranty 
Agreement. Therefore, the trial court has properly 
framed the issues in this case, as follows: 
1. Did Hudson sign the Loan Guaranty 
Agreement? 
2. Did Osborne defraud Hudson to obtain 
Hudson's signature on the Loan Guaranty 
Agreement? 
3. Did the Bank have knowledge of, partici-
pate in, or was it chargeable with notice of 
the purported fraud to obtain Hudson's 
signature on the Loan Guaranty Agree-
ment? (R. 204) 
With regard to the first issue, the court found 
that Hudson signed the Loan Guaranty Agreement, 
and this finding is not sought to be reversed by Hud-
son. 
With regard to the remaining two issues, here-
after referred to as "Point I" and "Point II," the 
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trial court has adopted the general rule in this coun-
try which is set forth in Annot. 71 A.L.R. 1278: 
... in the United States, when a principal ob-
ligor has induced his surety or guarantor to 
sign an instrument by false or fraudulent rep-
resentations, such misrepresentations may not 
be set up by the surety or guarantor as a de-
fense to an action on the indorsemen t or guar-
anty unless the obligee or guarantee had notice , 
of, or participated in, such fraud. 
POINT I 
HUDSON DID NOT PROVE HIS SIGNATURE 
WAS FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINED BY OS-
BORNE. 
Rule 9 (b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
requires that "In all averments of fraud or mistake, 
the circumstances constituting fraud or mistake shall 
be stated with particularity .... " Claims of fraud 
must be pleaded with particularity; therefore, it fol- 1 
lows that they must be proved with particularity. 
Not only must the particular facts of the fraud be 
proved, but the burden is clearly upon the party (in 
this case Hudson) asserting the fraud. The evidence 
of fraud must be clear, precise, and indubitable. The 
leading Utah case in this regard is Johnson v. Allen, 
108 U. 148, 158 P.2d 134 (1945), wherein the Court 
stated, at p. 138: 
In Kelley v. Salt Lake Transportation Co., 
supra[lOO Utah 436, 116 P.2d 386], we quot-
ed with approval from Pennsylvania R. Co. v 
Shay, 82 Pa. 198, in which it was stated: "It 
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has been more than once held that it is error to 
submit a qiiestion of fraud to the jury upon 
slight parol evidence to overturn a written in-
strument. The evidence of fraud must be clea.r_., 
precise and indubitable; otherwise, it should 
be withdrawn from the jury." (Emphasis ad-
ded.) 
The leading case in Utah as to the elements of 
fraud is Oberg v. Sanders, 111 U. 507, 184 P.2d 229 
(1947), wherein, at p. 234, the Court cited the ele-
ments from Stuck v. Delta Land & Water Co., 63 U. 
495, 227 Pac. 791 (1924), as follows: 
" ... (1) A representation; (2) its falsi-
ty; ( 3) its materiality; ( 4) the speaker's 
knowledge of its falsity or ignorance of its 
truth; ( 5) his intent that it should be acted 
upon by the person and in the manner reason-
ably contemplated; ( 6) the hearer's ignorance 
of its falsity ; ( 7) his reliance upon its truth ; 
( 8) his right to rely thereon; ( 9) his conse-
quent and proximate injury." 
One searches in vain through Hudson's Brief 
(including all evidence which Hudson claims to have 
been erroneously excluded by the trial judge) to find, 
with any degree of particularity, statements, sup-
ported by references to the evidence, setting forth the 
fraud practiced on Hudson. Hudson does not know 
what happened (R. 7 and R.98) and did not offer 
any evidence to show how his signature came to be 
placed on the Loan Guaranty Agreement. The ex-
cluded evidence referred to in Points I and II of Hud-
son's Brief, showing that Osborne may have used 
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some of the loan proceeds to cover his misappropria-
tions at the Moab National Bank, that he was con-
victed of a crime for those misappropriations, and 
that Osborne, in getting Hudson to guaranty the loan, 
"was able to hang one in him," does not shed any light 
on how Hudson's signature came to be placed on the 
'Loan Guaranty Agreement. Giving the evidence cited 
in Hudson's Points I and II the most favorable inter-
pretation to Hudson, it only shows that Osborne was 
in trouble, that he may have used some of the money 
in an attempt to deal with his trouble, and that he 
didn't like Hudson. This interpretation does not show 
any fraud practiced upon Hudson by Osborne with 
respect to the signature on the Loan Guaranty Agree-
ment, and certainly it does not show what the fraud 
was. vVe are left only to speculate as to what happen-
ed. It is submitted that even with all evidence and all 
proffered evidence refused by the trial court, Hudson 
has not met his burden of proof as to fraud. Accord-
ingly the rejection by the trial court of any proffered 
evidence would be harmless errer (if error at all), 
and not grounds for reversal of the trial court. U.R.-
C.P. 61; U.R.E. 5. 
POINT II 
HUDSON DID NOT PROVE THE BANK HAD 
NOTICE OF ANY PURPORTED FRAUD. 
In the event the issue of fraud set forth above is 
determined adversely to Hudson, there is no need to 
consider the issue of notice. In the event the Court 
8 
does consider the issue of notice, it is to be noted that 
Hudson does not maintain that the Bank had actual . 
knowledge of any purported fraud or that the Bank 
participated in any purported fraud. The trial court 
in rendering its opinion considered the evidence in 
the case and the proffered evidence of Mr. Chatelain 
which the court ref used to admit into evidence and 
properly decided that reasonable minds could not dif-
fer and the Bank had no notice of and was not charge-
able with notice of any purported fraud. ( R. 206-207) 
Each point raised by Hudson in his Brief will be 
rebutted point by point. 
REBUTTAL TO HUDSON'S POINT I 
A. THE EVIDENCE IS NOT RELEVANT 
AND MA TE RIAL. 
The important question before the Court with 
regard to fraud is: "What was the fraud, if any, up-
on Hudson that induced him to sign the Loan Guar-
anty Agreement?" Hudson's answer is, "We do not 
know." Hudson must show fraud to sustain his burden 
of proof, and this cannot be done by saying, "We do 
not know what happened." A person should not be 
able to avoid a written instrument and his signature 
on it by saying, in essence, ''I cannot remember sign-
ing that instrument." The argument made by Hud-
son in Point I goes to show that Osborne embezzled 
money from the Moab National Bank and that he ap-
plied such money to his own purposes. Nothing in 
Hudson's Point I shows how Hudson can demonstrate 
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the elements to bring this case within Stuck v. Delta 
supra, to establish that Osborne made a representa~ 
tion to Hudson; that the regresentation was false· 
' that the representation was material; that Osborne 
knew any such representation was false; or that Os. 
borne intended that any such representation be acted 
upon by Hudson. 
The "scheme or plan" referred to in Hudson's 
Point I is based upon conjecture and speculation and 
does not show a "scheme or plan," but the mere pos-
sibility of one. This "scheme or plan" set forth in 
Point I contains numerous flaws and incorrect state-
ments of fact. For example, Point 2 ( c), on page 27 
of Hudson's Brief, indicates that he was deceived and 
tricked into signing the Loan Guaranty Agreement· 
There is not one scintilla of evidence of this in the 
record to support this view except Hudson's self-serv-
ing statement to the effect that he "doesn't know" 
how his signature got on the Loan Guaranty Agree-
ment. This is an essential point that cannot be assum-
ed, but must be proved by Hudson! With regard to 
paragraph numbered 2 ( d) on page 27 of Hudson's 
Brief, there is no evidence to indicate that Osborne 
tried to convince the Bank not to contact Hudson. 
Hudson at pages 32 and 33 speculates that Os-
borne was under a ''compelling necessity" to obtain a 
signature from Hudson which was witnessed in order 
that such signature could be compared with the sig-
nature on the Loan Guaranty Agreement. There is 
no evidence to this effect. The comparison of one sig-
10 
--
nature to another signature is not facilitated by hav-
ing a witness to one signature. Hudson on page 33 
would have this Court believe that Osborne concocted 
the story that he and Hudson might be able to pur-
chase the controlling stock interest in the Moab Na-
tional Bank. There is no evidence in the record that 
this "story" is not completely true. Hudson and his 
accountant, both Moab residents and active in its bus-
iness community, cooperated to submit Hudson's fin-
ancial statement (R. 48-58, 172-177). This fact, plus 
Hudson's admitted prior purchase of Moab National 
Bank stock ( R. 55) and previous guarantee of other 
persons' loans ( R. 80) strongly suggest that Os-
borne' s story was in fact true. 
The most that can be said for the argument in 
Hudson's Point I is that the evidence sought to be ad-
mitted might be useful to corroborate other evidence. 
But there is no other evidence! 
B. GENERALLY, A CRIMINAL CONVIC-
TION IS NOT ADMISSlBLE IN A CIVIL CASE. 
The cases and authorities cited on pages 29 
through 31 of Hudson's brief all refer to criminal 
cases, where evidence of a prior crime is sought to be 
admitted against a person who committed the prior 
crime. This is a civil case. The general rule through-
out the United State is that a conviction in a crim-
inal case is not admissible in a civil case as evidence 
of facts upon which a conviction is based. Annot., 18 
A.L.R. 2d 1290. This appears to be the purpose of 
11 
Hudson in seeking to introduce this evidence, since 
Hudson seeks to go into the detail of the embezzle. 
ment. The following quotation is found at page 13 of 
93 A. 2d in the case of Mead v. Wiley Methodist Epi,s. 
copal Church, 23 N.J. Super 324, 93 A.2d 9 (1952): 
The weight of authority in New Jersey 
and throughout the United States favors the 
rule that a judgment of conviction or acquittal 
rendered in a criminal prosecution, cannot b~ 
shown in evidence in a purely civil action to 
establish the truth of the facts on which it is 
rendered. (Cases cited) . 
Hudson's Brief, at page 34, cites U.R.E., and 
certain language is italicized. U.R.E. 55 might jus-
tify the admission of Osborne's criminal conduct if 
Osborne's testimony were in issue in a suit between 
Hudson and Osborne to establish their respective lia-
bilities; however, in this case the issue relates to 
Hiidson's conduct as it affects his liability to the 
Bank. Even if U.R.E. 55 were applicable and Os· 
borne's criminal conduct was admitted into evidence, 
it would only show Osborne had a motive to obtain 
money to cover his embezzlements and would not 
prove the element of fraud practiced upon Hudson. , 
Osborne's criminal conduct would not explain how 
Hudson's signature got on the Loan Guaranty Agree-
ment. 
C. THE EVIDENCE PROPOSED IS UNDU-
LY PREJUDICIAL MATERIAL. 
The trial court expressed concern that the in-
12 
troduction of evidence regarding Osborne's embezzle-
ment would unduly prejudice the jury. (R. 10) The 
trial court was obviously concerned with this matter 
throughout the proceedings of this trial, as evidenced 
by the trial court's granting of a motion for change of 
venue from 'Moab to Monticello because of the preju-
dicial effect of trying this case in Osborne's and Han-
son's home town. Even if the Court should find as rel-
evant that evidence relative to Osborne's embezzle-
ment which was excluded, it is permissible for the 
trial court to exclude this circumstantial evidence 
upon the ground that it would creat unfair prejudice. 
U.R.E. 45 (b) is as follows: 
DISCRETION OF JUDGE TO EXCLUDE 
ADMISSIBLE EVIDENCE. 
Except as in these rules otherwise provid-
ed, the judge may in his discretion exclude evi-
dence if he finds that its probative value is 
substantially outweighed by the risk that its 
admission will ... (b) create substantial dan-
ger of undue prejudice or of confusing the is-
sues or of misleading the jury ... 
NOTE: This applies to frequently arising 
situations where the trial may get out of hand 
by the injection of collateral issues having only 
slight probative value and which would tend to 
confuse the jury, or have illegitimate emotion-
al appeal. Obviously, the judge should have 
some discretion to prevent the trial from go-
ing off on tangents of relative unimportance. 
Likewise some protection is needed from un-
fair surprise with respect to such matters. 
This represents the sort of thing which the 
trial judge does every day in actual practice 
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and which is sanctioned here, in the assurance 
that the results of rare and harmful abuse of 
discretion will be readily corrected on appeal. 
It is a rule of necessity. Its sanction cannot 
be escaped if we are to have orderly and effi-
cient trial procedure. 
Accord, Bunten v. Dav'is, et al., 82 N.H. 304, 133 Atl. 
16 (1926); State v. Flett, 234 Or. 124, 380 P.2d 634 
(1963). 
The case of Underwood v. Strasser, 48 Wis. 2d 
568, 180 N.W. 2d 631 (1970), stressed the impor-
tance of Rule 303 of the Model Code of Evidence (the 
parallel rule to U.R.E. 45), giving the trial judge dis- , 
cretion to exclude admissible evidence if its probative 
value is outweighed by the risk that its admission 
will create substantial danger of undue prejudice or 
of confusing the issues or misleading the jury. 
The Court is referred to State v. Winget, 6 Utah 
2d 243, 310 P.2d 738 ( 1957), wherein Justice Wade 1 
thoroughly discussed this point in a criminal law con-
text, at pages 739-40 of the Pacific Reporter. 
The Court should be reluctant to reverse the trial 
court in a matter of this nature, since the trial judge , 
is in a unique position to judge the exigencies of a 
particular case, and he has the duty to keep the trial 
within proper bounds. 
REBUTTAL TO HUDSON'S POINT II 
The trial court found that the statement of Os-
borne to May was not a declaration against interest, 
or, perhaps more properly, an admission against in· 
14 
terest ( R. 108, 110-112). The Court's attention is 
directed to U .R. E. 63 ( 7) and ( 10) for such distinc-
tion. It is submitted that the trial court is correct, 
that the statement of May is vague and ambiguous 
and not an admission against interest. It is suscepti-
ble, as the trial judge pointed out, of more than one 
interpretation. For example, one could conclude from 
the language that Hudson's signature was rightfully 
on the Loan Guaranty Agreement and he was going 
to have to pay it since Osborne could not. If that were 
the case, Osborne would be "hanging one in" Hudson. 
(R.111-112). The evidence was offered as an excep-
tion to the hearsay rule. If admitted in this manner, 
as stated in Hudson's Brief at p. 38, the language 
"must have been expressed in definitive, certain and 
unequivocal language ... " An excellent statement 
regarding relevancy and materiality, applicable to 
the case at hand, is found in the civil case of State v. 
Lee, et al., 227 Ind. 25, 83 N.E. 2d 778, at p. 780 
(1949): 
The exact question presented with respect 
to the admissibility of the exhibit so far as we 
can find, has not been presented to this court 
before. It must therefore be determined by the 
application of the general rules with respect 
to legal relevance. While offered evidence may 
be logically relevant, its admission must be 
subject to the primary test of its value in the 
particular case. Practical conditions do not per-
mit the court to hear every matter that may 
be in any degree logically relevant to the issue, 
but require that matters received as evidence 
shall have a higher degree of probative force 
15 
which may be termed legal relevancy or mater-
iality. Offered evidence which does not meas-
ure up to this requirement may be properly 
rejected. The exclusion of evidence as not ma-
terial either because too remote, too uncertain 
or too conjectural is a matter largely within 
the discretion of the 'trial court. See 31 C.J.S. 
Evidence §159, p. 866; Nickey v. Zonker, 1903: 
31 Ind. App. 88, 90, 67 N.E. 277; Insurance 
Co. of North America v. Brim, 1887, 111 Ind. ' 
281, 286, 12 N.E. 315; Jones v. Julian, 1859 
12 Ind. 27 4; 20 Am.J ur. Evidence§§ 246, 247: 
p. 239,240. 
The Court is also ref erred to U .R. E. 1 ( 2) . 
RE BUTT AL TO HUDON'S POINT III 
It appears to Bank that the trial court's ruling 
in refusing to receive the evidence of Hudson's wit-
ness, Utah State Bank Examiner, Mr. Chatelain, is 
founded on 'the fact that he was either ( 1) not quali- 1 
fied to set forth a standard applicable to this case, or 
(2) if so qualified, that no standard is applicable up-
on the particular facts of this case. Mr. Chatelain was 
unable to state that he was familiar with standards 
o'f bankers in the locality of Grand Junction, Colo-
1 
rado. (R. 182). Note that Mr. Chatelain was never 
asked if he was familiar with the standards of bank-
ers in Moab, Utah, and therefore never stated that 
he was familiar with such standards. Interrogation 
of Mr. Chatelain by the trial judge (R. 186-187) 
clearly showed that loan officers are vested with 
great discretion and that insufficient evidence had 
16 
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been presented to establish a commercial standard 
against which to measure Mackley's conduct; there-
fore, the Court refused to admit the evidence. See U. 
R.E. 57. The trial court referred to the case of Nau-
man v. Harold K. Beecher & Associates, 24 Utah 2d 
172, 467 P. 2d 610 (1970), as being a similar case to 
the one at hand ( R. 181). In that case the court held 
that the standard of care to which an architect was 
held was the standard of a reasonably prudent archi-
tect practicing in the locality in question. According-
ly, the standard to be used in this case, if applicable, 
is that of a reasonably prudent banker practicing in 
the locality of Grand Junction, Colorado, and Moab, 
Utah. This approach is also approved in II Wigmore, 
EVIDENCE §461 (3rd ed.), wherein it is stated, at 
pages 489-490, that a standard of conduct is a matter 
of substantive law, and testimony of a person regard-
ing that standard is receivable only as some evidence 
of the standard. The testimony as to the conduct of 
others must be as to conduct occurring under circum-
stances substantially similar. The trial court in the 
instant case decided that Mr. Chatelain could not 
testify because no standards in the Moab, Utah-
Grand Junction, Colorado, area were established 
against which to measure the Bank's conduct. 
There is a further fundamental reason why the 
testimony of Mr. Chatelain was inadmissible. The 
standards referred to in Point III of Hudson's Brief 
are standards established and existing for the pro-
teetion and benefit of the depositors and stockhold-
17 
ers of the banks. This is further reinforced by a re-
ference to the hypothetical question put to Mr. Chate-
lain on pages A-14 to A-18 of Hudson's Brief which 
refers to commercially reasonable standards in the 
banking industry and includes factors such as: 
1. That Osborne's net worth in and of itself 
wouldn't justify a $60,000.00 loan. 
2. That Mackley didn't have a current finan-
cial staJtement on Osborne. 
3. That Mackley did nothing to verify the 
financial responsibility of Hudson. 
Mr. Chatelain's rejected testimony related to Mr. . 
Mackley's obligations to the Bank and its depositors 
and stockholders - not to Mackley's alleged duty to 
Hudson, if any. The "reasonable commercial stan-
dards in the banking business" described in the prof-
fered Chatelain testimony are not responsive to the 
proposition Hudson sought to prove. 
If this Court were to hold 'that Mackley had a 
duty to personally contact the guarantor, Hudson, it 
would impose upon all commercial transactions in 
the State of Utah from this date forward a new and 
novel burden. How could banks and all other business 
enterprises respond 'to such a holding? It would re-
quire every guarantor to personally appear before 
the lender! How otherwise could a lender be assured 
that the guarantor would not attempt to avail him-
self of a defense based upon such a holding? 
The question is whether Bank is chargeable with 
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notice of the alleged fraud. Bank agrees with the 
principle announced in Jungk v. Holbrook, 15 U. 198, 
49 Pac. 305, 307 ( 1897), that "If a party is put upon 
injury as to a particular fact, he is charged in law 
with whatever inqury will disclose." 
The only inquiry in this situation which would 
have indicated that the signature was fraudulently 
obtained (if it was) would have been direct contact 
with Hudson. Obtaining a credit report on Hudson 
would have revealed nothing about how his signature 
came to be placed on the Loan Guaranty Agreement, 
but would only have shown that Hudson was a good 
financial risk (R. 101). Likewise, contacting the 
loan committee or another officer of Bank would not 
have given any information about any alleged fraud. 
What, then, are the circumstances, if any, wh'ich 
would have raised the warning flag to Bank that the 
signature was fraudulently obtained by Osborne so as 
to charge Bank with a duty to contact Hudson? The 
fact that Mackley did not know Hudson does not sug-
gest any fraud was involved. The fact that the finan-
cial statement of Hudson was addressed to Moab Na-
tional Bank was not out of the ordinary and, accord-
ingly, does not suggest any fraud was involved. The 
fact that the Loan Guaranty Agreement was not wit-
nessed would concern Mackley only to the extent of de-
termining the authenticity of the signature. Once sat-
isfied that the signature was genuine (as it admitted-
ly was) , there would be no reason to further pursue 
that matter. The fact that Hudson signed the Loan 
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Gauranty Agreement rather than the Note would not 
suggest any fraud, especially since the Bank preferr-
ed a separate Loan Guaranty Agreement (R. 131-
132) · The blanks in the Loan Guaranty Agreement do 
not raise an inference that something was amiss, since 
the information inserted in the blanks was not signif-
icant and such information might have been filled in 
by one of Bank's secretaries (R. 149). Osborne's 1 
low net worth and borrowing history with the Bank 
simply indicate that he could not borrow $60,000.00 
on his own, not that he defrauded Hudson. 
Sub-points A and B of Hudson's Point III will 1 
not be rebutted in detail, the foregoing comments be-
ing applicable to such sub-points. 
Hudson has referred to the Uniform Commer-
cial Code for analogy. The Uniform Commercial Code 
is not applicable to the instant case. This relates to 
the Loan Guaranty Agreement, which is not a ·"nego-
tiable instrument." U.C.A. §§ 70A-3-102(1) (e) and 
78-3-104 (1953), as amended. Hudson has attempted 
by this analogy to open Pandora's box to matters 
which are not properly in the case, in particular the 
questions of whether the First National Bank is a 
"holder" or a "holder 'in due course." The drafters 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, by not including 
guaranties within the Code, obviously did not intend 
to speak as to guaranties, and the Court should not 
use the words of the Code '.for purposes other than 
intended by the drafters of the Code. 
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REBUTTAL TO HUDSON'S POINT IV 
Hudson labels this case as one involving fraud 
in factum - that he signed a paper unknowingly. 
There is no evidence to support this proposition other 
than Hudson's protestation that he doesn't know how 
his signature got on the Loan Guaranty Agreement. 
Hudson failed to establish the facts necessary to pre-
vail in this defense. To prevail, Hudson has the bur-
den of proof to establish clearly, precisely, and in-
dubitably that a fraud was practiced upon him. Page 
6, supra. As Hudson concedes at page 56 of his 
Brief, he must be free from negligence to be able to 
rely on fraud in factum. Upon what evidence can 
Hudson rely to support his claim that he was not neg-
ligent? Bank asserts there is no clear, precise, and 
indubitable evidence to support his claim. To the con-
trary, the evidence demonstrates the probability of 
his negligence. What other rational explanation is 
there? Hudson, a sophisticated businessman, who has 
signed hundreds of legal documents and regularly 
employs an accountant and a lawyer, signed the Loan 
Guaranty Agreement which was not slipped into a 
stack of documents (R. 44-45). People who sign doc-
uments which are plainly written, or maybe in blank, 
must expect to be held liable thereon. Watkin Pro-
ducts, Inc., v. Butterfield, 274 Minn. 378, 144 N.W. 
2d 56 ( 1966). 
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In an attempt to present evidence of fraud in 
factum, Hudson, on page 59 of his Brief, states the 
following: 
He (Hudson) was misled into believing 
that he was signing some kind of paper relat-
ing to his waiver of interest on Certificates 
of Deposit cashed prior to the end of the 90-day 
period for which they were issued. ( Paren- 1 
thetical added.) 
There is no possible way that any of the evidence 
in this case can be construed in the manner Hudson 
attempts to construe it in the quotation above. There 
is no evidence as to what Hudson "thought" he was 
signing. The Certificates of Deposit were purchased 
by Hudson in 1968 and surrendered by him prior to 
June, 1969 (R. 85-86.) 
REBUTTAL TO HUDSON'S POINT V 
Hudson commences his argument by referring 
to a remedy of summary judgment. This matter was 
decided, by directed verdict, not summary judgment. 
A summary judgment motion was made earlier in ) 
this case, and the trial court refused to grant it. The 
trial court's refusal to grant summary judgment in 
1 
this case indicates its concern for a full hearing and · 
presentation of evidence in this matter. 
A directed verdict should be granted, and sustained 
on appeal, when there is an absence of any substan-
tial evidence to support a verdict for defendant. Koer 
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v. Mayfair Market, 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566 
( 1967). The Court is directed to the emphasized por-
tion of Johmon v. Allen, supra, pages 6-7. In the case 
at hand, there is a written instrument and only slight 
parol evidence presented to overturn the written in-
strument. The evidence of fraud in this case is not 
clear, precise, and indubitable. 
CONCLUSION 
I 
Hudson signed the Loan Guaranty Agreement. 
II 
The burden of proof was upon Hudson to prove 
with particularity and clearly, precisely, and indubi-
tably that a fraud was practiced upon him by Os-
borne. Hudson failed to sustain that burden; there-
fore, judgment for the Bank follows as a matter of 
law. 
III 
Even if Hudson had surmounted his heavy bur-
den of proving fraud, he would then have been con-
fronted by the task of proving the Bank's notice of the 
fraud. Hudson's evidence did not prove his allega-
tion; therefore, judgment for the Bank would follow 
as a matter of law. 
It follows from the foregoing that Judge Sheya 
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correctly directed the verdict for Bank, and the judg. 
ment of the trial court should be affirmed. 
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